Written by Malak Seoudi
Table of Contents
A brief history of Peace Operations
- Peacekeeping operations
- Peace-enforcement operation
- Who contributes and how do they do it?
What is a Successful peace operation?
- A little bit of review and explanation
- When is a mission successful? When has it failed?
Peacekeeping: the case of Sierra Leone
Peace-enforcement: the cases of the Democratic Republic of Congo and of Burundi (2004-7)
- Another type of concern: Can Troops become an obstacle to the mandate?
Peacekeeping and peace-enforcement are both peace operations, mandated by the United Nations. They share the same end goal, they seek to bring peace to an unstable region. However, they have different mandates to achieve said goal. While they both long to reach peace, the missions mandated by both these peace operations have different tools at their disposition and operate in different contexts.
Since the Second World War ended, and with the creation of The League of Nation in 1920, and then the United Nations in 1945, member states of the United Nation have been involved in missions throughout the four continents to aid in the process of peace (keeping or enforcing). Globalization further encouraged this type of involvement in times of crises by foreign powers.
However, certain rules must be followed when undertaking such an intervention, these rules and their effect on the regional peace process differ depending on which type of peace mission in being managed. These differences influence the ongoing processes and outcomes of operations. Which brings us to our question of focus. We are going to analyze and compare two different types of peace operations to answer the following question: which is more effective: peacekeeping or peace enforcement?
To find an answer to this inquiry we will, first, explain what each of the peace operations entails, how it came to be, and who contributes to these peace operations. In our second point, we will talk about what is considered a successful mission, as well as the factors of victory that make it successful. In our third point, we will talk about the successes and failures of peacekeeping missions. Then we will discuss the same things concerning peace-enforcement missions.
After which we will compare both our findings and conclude which, between a Peacekeeping mission or a Peace-enforcement mission, is more effective. We will argue that the answer to this question is rather subjective on the meaning of success itself, as this will lead to different answers and priorities within the missions themselves.
A brief history of Peace Operations
Before comparing both peacekeeping missions and peace-enforcement missions, it is important to understand their history and how they came to be. Nowadays, the United Nations’ Peacekeeping operations helps countries go through the difficult process of passing from conflict to peace.
It does so with unique strengths, some of which are legitimacy, burden sharing to address a range of mandates set by the United Nations Security Council and the General Assembly. However, peacekeeping and peace-enforcement missions take their strengths and legitimacy from a different set of rules. Let us explain.
The following is from my knowledge. It all begins with the Suez Canal Crisis, which was the trigger that brought to be the concept of peacekeeping itself. In 1956, the Suez Canal was nationalized by Egypt. As retaliation, France and Britain, aided by Israel, invaded parts of it. The two-colonial power were worried because they owned companies situated there, moreover, it was also a matter of prestige for the colonial empires. It was then that UNEF, (the United Nations’ Emergency Force), was created to oversee the departure of the colonizing forces.
Pressured by other State powers and the UN, Britain, and France finally left but only after ensuring that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces (NATO) were in place. Indeed, as a neutral force, their presence assured the two colonial powers that the Canal would remain an available route for their usage, amongst other worries. The men sent were not equipped well enough to fight, they also wore blue helmets to be easily recognizable and seen, camouflage being unnecessary since they were not sent as an offensive force.
They were, principally, a symbolic presence. These types of missions continued after the League of Nation ceased to exist and the United Nation took its place. Today, conventional peacekeeping missions follow a certain number of principles set by the United Nation’s Security Council. The following is a list of what we understand as being the four most important ones, that can also serve as a summary of peacekeepers’ mandate. When undergoing a (traditional) peacekeeping mission, the UN personnel and UN troops must ensure the following principles are respected at all times:
- Minimal use of force, (it can only be used in self-defense or in defense of civilians), fire only if attacked first.
- Respect national sovereignty.
Paid for by the UN members, (one state’s interest does not influence the troops as they have multiple financers).
In other words, the troops are lightly armed as they are not expected to get involved in battles. Blue helmets are part of the uniform to serve as a non-camouflage attire because they are not an offensive force, but a neutral peaceful defensive force. They should not care about being seen as they are not part of the conflict.
Furthermore, all (legitimate) parties of the conflict must consent to the deployment of forces of the peacekeeping mission. This does not include rebel groups as they are not recognized by States, and thus are illegitimate. Likewise, as peacekeepers are in no way part of the conflict, they do not take sides in the battles, or other internal conflicts that may arise. Nor do they take sides verbally, expressing their point of view. They must at all times be viewed as impartial so that the mission doesn’t lose its legitimacy.
Peacekeeping can also be more active, it’s what is called robust peacekeeping. The first changes in peace operations occurred during the cold war. Post-Cold war missions changed in functions as their mandates now features promoting democracy and assuring Human Rights are respected.
These ideas derive from the Democratic Peace theory and the idea that failed States can create wars. The challenges Peace-operations faced In Somalia (1992-1993), Bosnia (1992-1995), and the Genocide in Rwanda (1994) brought up a desire to render peace operations more efficient, thus was added to the mandate the Responsibility To Protect. The Responsibility to Protect (or R2P) “embodies a political commitment to end the worst forms of violence and persecution.
It seeks to narrow the gap between Member States’ pre-existing obligations under international humanitarian and human rights law and the reality faced by populations at risk of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.”
Over the years, peace missions have evolved and tried to accommodate to contexts and emerging issues. The mandates of peacekeeping missions started to evolve with the new issues they had to act in. For example, peacekeepers were slowly being more heavily armed as to have the capacity to defend themselves against attacks and protect civilians.
Nowadays, there are many types of peace missions being mandated by the United Nations such as peacekeeping, peace enforcing, robust peacekeeping, state-building, post-conflict state-building, stabilization, etc. However, as stated previously, we are only going to discuss two of these missions: (conventional) peacekeeping missions and peace enforcing missions. How do these two differentiate from one another? Now that we know how peacekeeping operations came to be, let’s talk about how peace-enforcement first emerged as a peace operation, as well as what their mandate entails.
Today, “Peace-enforcement involves measures to compel a recalcitrant party to abide by the resolutions of an international body.” Furthermore, we can find the premises to peace-enforcement mission in Chapter VII of the UN charter. This chapter allows the use of force to impose UN resolutions and ceasefires created. It “contains provisions related to ‘Action with Respect to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Aggression.’”. Another definition, given by the United States military faction, defines peace-enforcement as a “military intervention to forcefully restore peace between belligerents who may be engaged in combat.” From this, we can understand that the contextual difference between peacekeeping and peace-enforcement is the fact that there is no peace to keep when the United Nation’s personnel is deployed for the later.
Additionally, and this is an important point, in contrast to peacekeeping, peace-enforcement missions do not necessitate the consent of all involves (lawful) parties to be legitimate. Indeed, since peace-enforcement missions occur in contexts in which there is no peace to keep, the United Nation’s troops are expected to side against any spoilers to a peace agreement and to do so by taking military actions. The role of ‘open fire’ in peace-enforcement is well explained by Worell and Artillery when they say that:
“The role of fire support in peace enforcement is much more clear. It differs little from its use in war. Rules of engagement establish the limits for the use of force. Furthermore, impartiality is not a consideration for peace enforcement. The effects of fire support are designed to coerce the enemy into accepting a peaceful solution. Recognition of the proportional amount of fire support needed is critical, however, since the goal is not to destroy, but to compel compliance in order to restore peace.”
In conclusion, peace-enforcement missions are more active, are not impartial as they aim to make the peace and not keep the peace. They are more active military wise, and are compelled by different legitimacy rules then peacekeeping missions. Now that we know what peacekeeping and peace-enforcement missions are, it would be wise to know by whom these missions are put in place and who participates.
Who contributes and how do they do it?
The United Nation’s Member State who finance the peace operations (through the UN) and those who provide military troops are not the same. The Top 3 providers as of 2017 are the United States (28.46%), China (10.25%), and Japan (9.68%). Furthermore, as can be seen in the first image of the appendix “those who pay, do no play…”, in other words, member states have different roles in the organization towards peace operation.
Developed countries (or rich countries) tend to be the major financers of UN-mandated peace operations, whereas developing countries provide troops. This dynamic is beneficial to all, the developing countries often cannot train their soldiers well nor pay them, sending them in UN-mandated operations is a way to ensure they receive proper training, but also proper uniforms and arms and a salary.
That being said, within a single mission there might still be a disparity between the different troops sent in the training and preparation they would have undergone from their home country. The training period provided by the United Nation not being long enough to cover all necessary fields. An important point to note is that the soldiers provided are only loaned from “troop-contributing countries” (TCCs), […] the UN has no disciplinary authority [ over them].”
As we have mentioned, while the UN now provides the necessary armament for troops there can still be some inequalities between, for example, Canadian troops and Indian troops on the field. This, in turn, can affect the outcome of the mission. More than the armed capacity, it is the training of the soldiers that is most important. Even if all do receive training from the UN, it is not enough Indeed, as can be seen in the “UN Peacekeeping Fatalities Caused by Malicious Actions” chart found in the appendix, peacekeeping operations have become less dangerous (even though some fluctuations can be noted) in term of death caused by a targeted attack.
However, being untrained to the specificity of the context of the conflict they will be sent to help resolve (peace-enforcement)/ or prevent from starting again (peacekeeping) can have multiple consequences, of which are the failure of the mandate objectives and danger to the troops’ lives. Indeed, ignorance of the dynamic on territories such as ethnic or religious tensions, cultural behavior towards respect, or gender dynamics (in respect of Human Rights) can affect the perceived legitimacy or the troops on the grounds.
As such, we can see that those who pay (developed countries) and those who play (developing countries) are not the same actors at all within the United Nation. However, this dynamic is beneficial to all as it permits the developing country to train, arm, feed, and pay their soldiers without having to use their own money to do so.
What is a Successful peace operation?
A little bit of review and explanation
Before we start our discussion about the accomplishments and failures of peacekeeping and peace-enforcement, it would be useful to have a good comprehension of what both missions entitle. Before starting our explanation of each mission, we would like to explain the difference between tactical and strategic practices within mandates.
When a mission has a tactical mandate, it means the details of the implementation are given, that there is a shorter time scale and a limited geographical frame. Questions asked by the commander of the missions are about, for example, what will happen tomorrow and what will be done by the troops. Whereas a Strategic mandate is about how the strategy will be implemented and has broader aims.
In a conflictual region, a strategic mandate would have the defeat of the rebels or insurgency in the mandate, for example. This is important to consider because a strategic mandate involves the troop in the conflict making it no longer a peace-making mission, as will be explained hereafter. Now that we have briefly explained the different types of a mandate, let’s define the two types of missions we will discuss.
In both peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations, the State is no longer considered as the power at the top of the chain. Peacekeeping is a mission in which there is a fragile peace to keep, and where blue helmets are lightly armed and only mandated to use force for defense. Whereas peace-enforcement is a mission where blue helmets are expected to make people fight, they will target the spoilers of peace or side that refuses to stop fighting.
Most importantly, we must have a good understanding of what it means for an operation to be successful. What is a successful peacekeeping mission? What is a successful peace-enforcement operation? Are there similar success/failure factors for both? When are they successful?
When is a mission successful? When has it failed?
According to the United Nation’s website, its peace operations have helped “end conflicts and foster reconciliation by conducting successful peacekeeping operations in dozens of countries, including Cambodia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mozambique, Namibia, and Tajikistan.” And have had a positive impact in recently ended or ongoing missions such as “Sierra Leone, Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire, Timor-Leste, Liberia, Haiti, and Kosovo”.
The website also talks about previous failures as ‘setbacks’ that “provided important lessons” such as the genocide in Rwanda. Surprisingly, under the denomination ‘What factors are required for success?’, we find a recollection of the peacekeeping principles, (impartiality, legitimacy, no use of force but on the defense), but no chart to judge the effectiveness of a particular mission. This leaves us with no clue as to what the factors for a successful mission are.
As such, there are a lot of questions concerning the success factors for a peace operation. If the troops have been deployed on the same ground for decades if their presence is the only reason there is no conflict, can we talk about peace, and is it a success? Is it not, in a way, fear of the UN troop presence that is preventing the fight, in which case their absence with mean a resurgence of the fighting. Is there, or should there be, a time limit concerning peace operations when they have lingered too long and have not resolved the issues? Are peace operations too light, do they not concentrate on resolving the core issues responsible for the conflict (making them successful only on a short time scale), or are they able to make communities move on from their conflicts?
Throughout the literature I encountered, including the official pages of the United Nation on peace operations, I have found very little clear answers to these questions. It seems the answer changes between political philosophers and depending on the case that is being presented.
The overall answer we can conclude from all of these is that it depends on each situation. Furthermore, as Edelstein puts it, “success is a continuous, not a dichotomous, variable”. Unfortunately, such an idea is not very helpful for our endeavor, thus we will present below some of the characteristics that are most commonly accepted when judging whether a peace operation has been successful or not. To make our analysis easier, we’ll consider the following factors to judge an operation’s success. We have chosen these factors because they are the ones that most thinkers seem to agree on (as well as the UN official reports and pages). Thereby, a successful peace operation has to complete the following criteria:
– Appropriate and achievable mandate: the objectives set by the mandate are the basis of a mission’s success; indeed, if they are not appropriate to each specific context, the mission is set to fail. For example, the Brahimi report indicates that this means that “the Secretariat must not apply best-case planning assumptions to situations where the local actors have historically exhibited worst-case behavior”.
– Accomplishments surpass costs: “To be successful, an occupation must accomplish enough of its initial goals to justify these costs”. This encompasses direct costs (such as financial costs and lives lost) as well as indirect costs (such as opportunity costs and rivalries generated by the presence of the peacekeepers).
– Mandate’s means must be open to change: as the situation might change with the local context in continual development throughout the time of the mission.
– Mandate implementation: this criterion is rather simple, had the objectives set by the mandate been met. Or if the operation is ongoing, are they in good progress?
– Length of a mission: this characteristic is not one that is taken as a serious measure as some missions necessitate a longer mandate to be implemented than others. Furthermore, putting a time limit to peacekeeping and peace-enforcement mission might prevent the mission from being successful. Nevertheless, we think it is a factor that should be considered for missions that have been ongoing for more than 10 years. It might be a sign that the mandate is no longer appropriate for said missions, or that it is not being well implemented. As such, this would be linked to the objectives being open to change, if the mandate changes over time with the appearance of new needs, then the length of the mission is less problematic.
Now that we have our criteria let’s start with our analysis. We will analyze one peacekeeping mission and two peace-enforcement mission – one which has ended and one which has been ongoing for over 17 years. Because of the length of this last mission, we will judge its effectiveness until today as an indication of its success.
Peacekeeping: the case of Sierra Leone
Peacekeeping operations seem to be well viewed in general. There have been a few cases that made people talk or frown, but they are viewed to be helpful and necessary missions by the general public. People tend to think they are necessary because of the existence of a ‘moral responsibility of the international community’.
The United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) was a peacekeeping operation from 1999 to 2006 to help the Lomé Peace Accord. The Security Council resolution 1270 in October 1999, gave UNAMSIL the mandate to cooperate with the parties to the Peace Agreement in its implementation, encourage the parties to create confidence-building mechanisms, facilitate humanitarian assistance and assist the government in disarmament and demobilization.
In 2000 were added the facilitation of the free flow of people, goods, and humanitarian assistance, provide security at all sites of disarmament and demobilization and coordinate with the Sierra Leone law enforcement authorities in the discharge of their responsibilities. After it achieved its mandate in December 2005, UNAMSIL was succeeded by a new mission, the United Nations Integrated Office for Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL) to help consolidate what was done.
Sierra Leone is considered by the United Nation as a success. The mandate was appropriate and achievable, as was proved when it was achieved. The Accomplishments surpassed the costs with little casualties (192 losses in 7 years), with a $2.8 billion budget and the completion of the mandate’s objectives, (disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, elections, Human Rights and Rule of Law, Economic Recovery and Development, and finally Public Opinion Survey of UNAMSIL). The mandate was also open to local needs changing as can be seen when the mandate was revised in 2000, and some objectives added.
As previously mentioned, peacekeeping operations tend to be generally viewed as successful, the difficulties they face usually not specific to peacekeeping operations but rather common difficulties peace operations have to face in general. As such, we would conclude that peacekeeping operations tend to be successful. Earlier ones like the failure with the Rwandan genocide, being a tragic source of learning to prevent another tragic repetition of it.
Peace-enforcement: the cases of the Democratic Republic of Congo and of Burundi (2004-7)
It seems that many literature authors think that peace-enforcement missions pause a threat to peace operations, their legitimacy, and the foundation of their mandate. Let’s take the example of two peace-enforcement missions. One that has yet to end, MONUSCO, and one that has already ended, ONUB.
First, let’s talk about the peace operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). It was the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide and the departure of Hutus into neighboring countries that created an opportunity for a new UN peace operation in the region. The mission started as the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC), later renamed the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO).
Before measuring the success of this mission, let us briefly explain its context, the following is information provided by the official website of MONUSCO. This peace operation was formed in November 1999 and is still active today. After the Rwandan disaster in 1994, over 1.2 million Hutus departed including some who had taken part in the genocide. A rebellion began in 1996, Kabila and his forces, aided by Rwanda and Uganda, fought against President Mobutu Sese Seko’s army, took the capital of Kinshasa in 1997, and renamed the country the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
In 1998, a rebellion started against Kabila’s government, supported by Rwanda and Uganda. The Security Council then called for a ceasefire, withdrawal of foreign forces (aiding aside), and urge states not to interfere. MONUC was essentially an observation mission of the ceasefire between the DRC and 5 other states involved in the rebellion (Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe), deployed after the Lusaka ceasefire agreement in 1999.
MONUC remained on the ground and helped organize the country’s first fair elections in 46 years in 2006, after which it continued to help implement a political process, military process and the application of the rule of law as mandated by the Security Council, as well as continuing to task over ongoing conflicts in some DRC provinces. Under MONUC, the mission was a traditional peacekeeping mission under Chapter VI mandate.
Let us explain why we consider this operation as a peace-enforcement mission and not a peacekeeping mission – which also happens to be the passage from MONUC to MONUSCO. On July 1st, 2010, the Security Council, by its resolution 1925, renamed the mission to reflect the new phase the country had reached. It authorized the deployed forces to “use all necessary means to carry out its mandate”, including the protection of civilians, humanitarian personnel, and to support the Government of the DRC in its stabilization and peace consolidation efforts.
Meaning, that the deployed forces are now allowed to use force actively and not just for defensive matters if doing so will help implement the mandate. MONUSCO is also to work in partnership with the Congolese government and helping to develop the country’s ability to deal with its challenges. Furthermore, the mission takes sides and loses impartiality necessary for peacekeeping missions by siding with the FARDC (the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo).As to the success of the mission, if we stick to the previously mentioned measures here is what we get.
The mandate seems to be problematic and contradictory, as it seems to be situated in a blurred line between peacekeeping and peace-enforcement, even after the passage to a MONUSCO mandate. The country is not stable yet. The corps lost 95 men in total, and a budget of $ 1, 141, 848, 100 as of 2017. Moreover, the passage from MONUC to MONUSCO shows that the mandate’s objectives remained open to adjustments to meet with new needs emerging with the developing context throughout the mission.
As for the mandate’s implementation, the peacekeepers do not get as actively involved in combats in the MONUSCO mission as the mandate authorizes, they have also been accused of misconduct, which also undermines the completion of the mandate itself, mainly trading with the FDLR which they side against as a peace-enforcement operation. As such, MONUSCO seems to be giving a rather pessimistic perspective for the future. And, as of today, it could be considered more a failure than a success.
As for the United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB), it was established by the United Nations Security Council in May 2004, under chapter VII of the UN Charter. They were sent to support the Burundians to restore lasting peace with the Arusha Peace Reconciliation Agreement signed on the 18th August 2000.
ONUB was mandated to assure the cease-fire agreements, monitor illegal movements of arms across borders, provide security for humanitarian assistance and United Nations personnel and materials, assist in the democratic elections process, protect civilians, monitor disarmament and demobilization of armed forces, promote trust between Burundian forces.
The security Council had also decided it would advise and assist the Interim Government and Authorities in their efforts to monitor the Burundi borders, reforms institutions, put in place electoral activities, reform the judicial and penitentiary systems while making sure it is not bringing prejudice to the missions it has set in the mandate.
We consider this to be a peace-enforcement mission because it was deployed through chapter VII of the UN Charter, the chapter named “Action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression”, which allows the Security Council to determine the existence of threats to the peace and to take military action according to it.
The mandate was achieved in December 2006, with a new mission, the United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi, (BINUB), following it to consolidate the peace. The mandate was appropriate to the context and achievable as was proven by its implementation. The accomplishment surpasses the costs, the mandate was achieved with few casualties (24 in total).
As such, we have two examples of peace-enforcement missions. One which is still ongoing and gives a pessimistic future perspective, and one that has finished with a successful implementation of its mandate.
Another type of concern: Can Troops become an obstacle to the mandate?
We would like to add an important factor to a mission’s success that is often omitted, and that is the way to be of the United Nation’s personnel. The troops are sent as helpers and should be perceived as such. However, over the years, some missions and misbehaviors have given peacekeepers a bad reputation. Let us briefly talk about these happening as they are characteristics that can help determine how successful a mission has been.
UN personnel, while not subject to the United Nation’s authority in respect of law and punishment, are beneficiary of privileges and immunities that include “immunity from personal arrest or detention, and immunity from legal process of every kind.”
This can exacerbate some tensions between the local communities and the troops as some soldiers, (because they feel untouchable) can be subject to illegal activities (mainly to the embarrassment of local women), or to activities that can be perceived badly by the local community. From a United Nations perspective, their troops are expected to behave accordingly to their status and mandate based on their moral compass alone. They are considered trustworthy for they “are responsible for upholding the core values of the UN: professionalism, integrity, and respect for diversity”.
However, such an expectation can be thought to be utopic considering the many rumors and accusations towards peacekeepers (some justified, some not, and others we will never know as they were not given a lot of attention). Let’s talk about some of these happening and the consequences they have on grounds (during the conflict/ peacekeeping or peace-enforcement operation, as well as after the mission has ended). Note that we name peacekeepers the men and women sent in uniform by the United Nation in both peacekeeping and peace-enforcing missions.
The most common accusations peacekeepers are faced with are made by women and concern sexual misbehaviors men (civilian or military personnel) are being accused of. To present some numbers, “from 2003 to 2006, 358 military personnel were investigated after allegations of SEA were made”. SEA, or Sexual exploitation and Abuse, can go from “sex with minors (under 18), employment for sex, sex with prostitutes, sexual assault, rape, and other incidents that include sex in exchange for food or assistance in kind”.
These accusations of sexual misconduct by UN personnel first emerged in a mission in Cambodia in 1992 and still prevail today. This renders women’s status in the community very fragile and makes the presence of UN troops and civilian personnel a new threat for gender-based violence. This is most concerning when we know, as mentioned above, that the United Nations has no means to bring justice to these crimes, nor do the local authorities (if still in place) as UN personnel are immune to such accusation.
Not only that, but the removal of said troops (or a rotation system) does not solve these problems. Indeed, when these women fall pregnant, they can be shunned socially and are left with a burden because “these so-called ‘peacekeeping babies’ and their mothers are left without support or provision”. This, in turn, annuls some of the objectives of the mandate for peace, as they can create new problems within the community (namely in terms of Human Rights). Fortunately, the UN is not blind to these problems and reports have been calling for taking actions, one of the proposals being that DNA tests should be conducted to establish paternity and ensure the child is being provided for.
In conclusion, means, context, the flexibility of the mandate, the local cooperation but also the troops and UN personnel’s actions are all factors to the success or failure of a mission. From all of our research and analysis, it seems that we would conclude that while peacekeeping mission are less violent, they evolve in a context of peace, which makes their success more likely (and easy).
Whereas peace enforcement missions are more delicate and dangerous to the peacekeepers, they still have a high success rate and are not necessarily more harmful than peacekeeping missions, just because they are more ‘violent’ in nature. In other words, comparing these two types of peace operation only brought the deduction that the success of a mission depends on the decisions that take place during it, and not on the type of mission itself. If decisions are taken by asking which type of mission is necessary and more suitable for each context, instead of wondering which type of operation has had more successes overall, then the mission is more likely to be successful.
In conclusion, peace-enforcement missions are more active, are not impartial as they aim to make the peace and not keep the peace. They are more active military wise and are compelled by different legitimacy rules than peacekeeping missions. Now that we know what peacekeeping and peace-enforcement missions are, it would be wise to know by whom these missions are put in place and who participates.
In short, those who pay (developed countries) and those who play (developing countries) are not the same actors at all within the United Nation. However, this dynamic is beneficial to all as it permits the developing country to train, arm, feed, and pay their soldiers without having to use their own money to do so.
Furthermore, while the United Nation doesn’t give a clear list of criteria to judge the level of success of a mission, and while each thinker has a different list of them, it is still possible to make a list of certain criteria that everyone seems to agree on. These criteria would be: an appropriate and achievable mandate, the cost being less than the accomplishment, the mandates’ means being flexible to change, the mandate being implemented, and the importance of considering the length of a mission and the reason for its duration.
The analysis of the peacekeeping mission in Sierra Leone shows that it was a successful mission. As previously mentioned, peacekeeping operations tend to be generally viewed as successful, the difficulties they face are usually not specific to peacekeeping operations but rather common difficulties to all peace operations. As such, we would conclude that peacekeeping operations tend to be successful.
Earlier ones like the failure with the Rwandan genocide, being a tragic source of learning to prevent another tragic repetition of it. We have also examined two examples of peace-enforcement missions. One which is still ongoing (MONUSCO) and gives a pessimistic future perspective, and one that has finished with a successful implementation of its mandate (ONUB).
In conclusion, means, context, the flexibility of the mandate, the local cooperation but also the troops and UN personnels’ actions are all factors to the success or failure of a mission. From all of our research and analysis, it seems that we would conclude that while peacekeeping mission are less violent, they evolve in a context of peace which makes their success more likely (and easy).
Whereas peace enforcement missions are more delicate and dangerous to the peacekeepers, they still have a high success grade and are not necessarily more harmful than peacekeeping missions, just because they are more ‘violent’ in nature. In other words, comparing these two types of peace operation only brought the conclusion that the success of a mission depends on the decisions that take place during the mission as well as it being adapted to the context it’s taking place in. It does not depend on the general success factor of the operations.
- Clark, Janine Natalya, “UN Peacekeeping in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Reflections on MONUSCO and Its Contradictory Mandate”, Journal of International Peacekeeping, Vol.15, 2011, p.363-383
- Edelstein, David, M., “Occupational Hazard. Why military Occupations succeed or fail”, International Security, vol.29, n1, 2004, p.49-91
- Grady, Kate, “Sexual exploitation and abuse by UN Peacekeepers: a threat to Impartiality”, International peacekeeping, vol.17, n.2, 2010, p.215-228.
- Keith J. Allred, “Peacekeepers and Prostitutes”, Sage Journals, Armed forces & Society, vol33, n.1, 2006, p.5-23.
- Kent, Vanessa L., “ Peacekeepers as perpetrators of abuse”, African Security Review, vol.14, n.2, 2010, p.85-92.
- Major Harold H.Worrell, jr.Field Artillery, A Monograph,“ The role of Support in Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement Operations”, School of Advanced Military Studies United States Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth Kansas, First Term AY93-94, p.1-51.
- Monusco website, https://monusco.unmissions.org/en/background, consulted on the 28th November 2017.
- MONUSCO website, French page, https://monusco.unmissions.org/faits-et-chiffres, consulted on the 28th November 2017.
- No author, “Peacekeeping, peacemaking, or peace-enforcement?”, Strategic Survey, vol.93.n.1, 1992, p.31-39.
- ONUB website, mandate ( French page) , http://www.un.org/fr/peacekeeping/missions/past/onub/mandate.shtml, consulted on the 28th November 2017.
- Simic, Olivera, “Does the presence of women really matter?”, International Peacekeeping, vol.17,n.2, 2010, p.188-199.
- Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, Executive Summary (Brahimi report).
- The National Security Strategy of the United States ( DRAFT), Sept.9, 1993
- UNAMSIL website , mandate, https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/past/unamsil/mandate.html, consulted on the 28th November 2017.
- UNAMSIL website, facts and figures, https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/past/unamsil/facts.html , consulted on the 28th November 2017.
- United Nations website on R2P, http://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/about-responsibility-to-protect.html , consulted on the 29th November 2017
- United Nations Peacekeeping website, https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mandates-and-legal-basis-peacekeeping , consulted on the 23rd November 2017
- United Nations Peacekeeping website, https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/our-successes , consulted on the 29th November 2017